On September 18, 2024, Pivot Legal Society (Pivot) and the BC Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) filed multiple complaints, under BC’s Police Act, against the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) for excessive use of force and the targeting and surveillance of people expressing support for Palestinian human rights. This particular Legal Submission is a Service and Policy complaint regarding VPD Surveillance of Demonstrators Supporting Palestinian Human Rights.

Read the complaint below and the joint press release.

Vancouver Police Board
2120 Cambie Street
Vancouver, BC  V56 4N6
[email protected]

Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner of British Columbia
5th floor, 947 Fort Street
PO Box 9895, Stn Prov Govt.
Victoria, BC  V8W 9T8
[email protected]

18 September 2024

SENT VIA EMAIL

Dear Members of the Vancouver Police Board,

RE: Service and Policy Complaint – VPD Surveillance of Demonstrators Supporting Palestinian Human Rights

We write on behalf of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (“BCCLA”) and Pivot Legal Society (“Pivot”) to initiate a service and policy complaint pursuant to s 168(2)(a) of the Police Act.^[1]  

Since the events of October 7, 2023, and Israel’s reprisals for the same, local Palestinians and supporters of Palestinian human rights of diverse backgrounds and identities have been reporting concerns about a heightened surveillance climate in Vancouver. This surveillance has persisted despite conflicting with a human-rights centered approach to service delivery, and VPD’s own policies. We are concerned with the staff and resource allocation, relevant policies not being followed, and internal procedures in relation to the surveillance of Palestine solidarity demonstrators and activists by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), a municipal police department within the meaning of the Police Act. An overarching concern is that the VPD’s practices regarding such surveillance is discriminatory in nature and motivated by anti-Palestinian racism.

Overview of Complaint

The monitoring of Palestine solidarity protesters in Vancouver should be understood as part of a wider pattern of repression and targeting of those who support Palestinian human rights, including the internationally recognized rights to self-determination and the return to their homeland. While many public officials and bodies have attempted to discredit such advocates in Vancouver and elsewhere in Canada as being “pro-Hamas,”^[2] the reality is that many people are distraught about what the International Court of Justice has determined is a plausible case of genocide in Gaza through Israel’s commission of genocidal acts that violate the Genocide Convention.^[3]

Part 1 of this complaint points to the evidence that informs our allegations that VPD’s policing of protestors supporting Palestinian human rights is biased. We submit that anti-Palestinian racism - a particular form of anti-Arab animus that excludes, demeans, dehumanizes, defames, and stereotypes Palestinians as inherently antisemitic or hostile to democratic values, and/or justifying violence against them^[4] - and the related problem of the “Palestine exception” is motivating the VPD’s systemic departure from its own policies and its unequal targeting of Palestinians and other members of diverse communities across the lower mainland who advocate for Palestinian human rights.

Part 2 outlines the details about the overt surveillance that has been consistently observed, and why we are so deeply troubled about it. The complainants and community members are concerned about the persistent and excessive surveillance by the VPD that prima facie violates relevant VPD policies. No rationale has been provided as to why the surveillance is being carried out contrary to existing VPD policy, whether additional software tools such as facial recognition are being used in conjunction with this surveillance, what the actual scope of violations has been to peoples’ reasonable expectations of privacy (including vulnerable people such as children and youth), and with whom the personal information collected through surveillance, or information derived therefrom, is being shared by the VPD.

Part 3 explains our concerns regarding the use and disclosure of personal information of protest participants by VPD Under the Guise of National Security or “Counter-Terrorism.”

Part 4 highlights how the VPD’s surveillance impacts democracy as well as rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.

Our recommendations for the Vanover Police Board are included in Part 5.

Although this service and policy complaint draws attention to specific instances of VPD surveillance of political expression in support of Palestinian human rights, we have concerns about how all of the political protests supporting this cause have been surveilled by the VPD. We have much more evidence that we can share with you to confirm that the surveillance has consistently occurred since last October 2023, that different recording devices have been used, drones have been deployed and multiple different VPD officers have been observed gathering the personal information of people through such surveillance practices.

1. The Palestine Exception and “Unbiased” Policing

A fundamental concern is that the VPD’s overt surveillance of protests in support of Palestinian human rights is an example of what is characterized as the Palestinian exception. That is, “where rights upheld for other individuals and groups are routinely denied to Palestinians and advocates i.e. freedom of expression or freedom of association.”^[5] Any discrimination by the VPD in its heavy surveillance of people supporting Palestinian human rights would be consistent with how other public safety officials and bodies in Canada have been behaving. The complainants have been monitoring how demonstrations in support of Palestinian human rights have attracted disproportionate policing resources in cities such as Vancouver and across Canada, in some cases allegedly involving political interference in the criminal charge approval process.^[6]

We recently learned that public safety ministers across the country falsely suggested that the pro-Palestine demonstrations amounted to “supporting terrorism or advocating for violence in Canada” despite having evidence to the contrary: “a narrative that would help set the tone for smears against pro-Palestinian demonstrations for the next eight months, and preceded a ramping up of policing efforts against activists in some cities.”^[7] This same news article highlights that Public Safety Canada “focused on pro-Palestine rallies, with less attention paid to those held in support of Israel’s brutal war on Gaza.” The complainants are concerned that the VPD has been similarly inequitable in how it has surveilled and policed people who express support for Israel’s war vis-à-vis those supporting Palestinian human rights.

Our concerns about the VPD’s policing being biased is supported by this statement in support of Israel by Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, an organization that VPD Chief Constable Adam Palmer belongs to. There is literally no other statement about any other “foreign” event on the news page of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

We also note that the statement released by VPD Chief Constable Palmer on October 13, 2023, about the October 7 attacks in Israel^[8] also appears to be an outlier in terms of linking foreign political issues to the safety of people in Vancouver. As is the case with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police website, the complainants cannot find any other news release or statement from the VPD or its Chief Constable about a foreign event and how it impacts local policing.

Further evidence that the surveillance practices forming the basis of this complaint are inherently discriminatory manifestations of the “Palestine Exception” is the fact that the Critical Response Unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) has been revealed to be supporting police agencies, likely including the VPD, at these demonstrations which they characterized as “pro-Hamas.”^[9] This descriptor is not only inaccurate but is a perfect example of anti-Palestinian racism.

There is no public transparency about the extent to which the VPD may be collaborating with this RCMP unit, which is also under a systemic investigation by its own oversight agency after attracting hundreds of complaints from people all over BC.^[10] It is very concerning to the complainants and to community members that the VPD, which publicly commits itself to unbiased and equitable policing, may be collaborating with an RCMP unit that disingenuously smears people who are doing nothing illegal and simply exercising their legal rights under the Charter.

Finally, the likely collaboration between the VPD and the RCMP in the surveillance of people expressing support for Palestinian human rights in Vancouver augments our concerns described below in section 4 about how personal information is being collected, used and shared. This is because the RCMP manages the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), a database that is accessible to Customs and Border Control officials in the United States of America to facilitate immigration, travel and other laws.^[11]

2. Details of Overt Surveillance

i. Drone Surveillance of Political Activity Violates VPD Policy

The complainants have received reports from community members of Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems (“RPAS”, commonly known as drones) flying over demonstrations in support of Palestinian human rights, apparently conducting surveillance in violation of publicly available VPD policy. Members of BCCLA staff have also observed such drone surveillance while attending demonstrations supporting Palestinian human rights.

Use of RPAS by VPD is governed by VPD policy 1.13.3^[12] which tightly restricts the circumstances in which it can be used. Use of RPAS for surveillance is prohibited by item 5 of this policy unless there is prior judicial authorization or exigent circumstances such that use of the RPAS can alleviate an imminent risk to life or safety. Item 6 of this policy explicitly prohibits the use of RPAS to identify members of the public involved in peaceful demonstrations or protests. In our submission, these restrictions are proper and compliance with them is necessary to safeguard fundamental freedoms protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).^[13]

We can share evidence supporting these submissions if the VPD denies that they have used drones in relation to demonstrations in Vancouver that support Palestinian human rights since October 7, 2023.

ii. Smartphone Surveillance of Politcal Actvity Supportng Palestnian Human Rights, Intrusions on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Ongoing Violatons of VPD Policy

We have also received reports of and have directly observed that VPD members are indiscriminately filming demonstrators supporting Palestinian human rights and other members of the public on smart phones. It is not clear whether these devices are departmentally issued or the members’ personal devices.

Vulnerable members of the public, including children and youth, have almost certainly had their personal information gathered by members of the VPD during these surveillance practices by the VPD.

(a) Concerns Related to VPD Smartphone Surveillance on December 2, 2023

On December 2, 2023, at a protest on the sidewalk at 1033 Robson St, in front of an Indigo bookstore in support of Palestinian human rights, BCCLA’s Policy Director, Meghan McDermott, noted that at least one VPD officer was using a smartphone to record audio and video of the demonstration on the public sidewalk. At approximately 1:45 pm, she asked the officer who appeared to be recording with the smartphone, Constable McClelland, whether it was a personal device and was told it was not. She then asked the member why the VPD was recording protestors on smartphones, given that the VPD policy 1.13.3 prohibits the use of a drone by the VPD for “surveillance purposes” and further limits the use of drones for “recording and/or identifying members of the public involved in peaceful protests or demonstrations.” His response was that he can film anywhere in public. This response was and is disconcerting to the Complainants as it reveals that the VPD or its individual members either do not appreciate the array of privacy considerations in public areas (i.e. although people have a reduced expectation of privacy in public, they have not abandoned their privacy interests altogether), or that they deliberately disregard them. The recording was ongoing and clearly captured personal identifying information of the protestors and other members of the public, including minors, who walked by and/or entered the Indigo bookstore.

This smartphone surveillance likely included audio, in which case additional personal information and conversations amongst people who had a reasonable expectation of privacy may have been collected by the VPD.

The smartphone filming took place inside the bookstore too, peering outside at the protest on the sidewalk. Below is a photo of VPD Constable McClelland at 2:54 pm on December 2, 2023, waving to Meghan McDermott from inside the Indigo Bookstore as he filmed the political demonstration with a smartphone. ["Image removed for publication"]

Meghan McDermott attended for the entirety of the protest. To the best of our knowledge, the VPD has not alleged that any crime occurred at or in front of the Indigo bookstore by anyone who gathered to express themselves at the protest action.

(b) Concerns Related to VPD Smartphone Surveillance on May 27, 2024

Meghan McDermott was at another political protest supporting Palestinian human rights at Robson Square on the evening of May 27, 2024, and observed a VPD officer using a smartphone to capture audio and video recordings of the public while also wearing a body worn camera.

Below is a photo of a member of the VPD wearing a body worn camera and holding a smartphone while they appear to record political expression and members of the public at Robson Square on May 27, 2024 at 6:52 pm. ["Image removed for publication"]

It is unknown if the VPD member that was observed with the smartphone, or any of the other observed members of the VPD nearby, had exercised their discretion to turn on their body worn camera(s).

We are unaware of the VPD having responded to any perceived criminal actions associated with the members of the public who gathered at Robson Square to express their political views.

(c) Concerns Related to VPD Smartphone Surveillance on June 18, 2024

BCCLA staff, including the Policy Director, observed officer McClelland filming in a public space (on the sidewalk outside VPD headquarters) on a smartphone at a press conference on June 18, 2024, about VPD’s response to a protest about Palestinian human rights.

This is unprecedented in our experience for events of this type, and we are very concerned about the rationale used by the VPD to order that such surveillance occur. In our view there was no indication whatsoever that the press conference event could be disruptive or pose a risk to the public.

Below is a photo of Officer McClelland using a smartphone at 12: 11 pm on June 18, 2024, to record members of the public participating in a press conference and other members of the public who happened to be using the same public space. Members of the media filming the press conference are in the foreground of the photo. ["Image removed for publication"]

As with the previous events described above, we are unaware of the VPD having responded to any perceived criminal actions associated with the members of the public who attended the event of the press conference on June 18,2024.

(d) Observed Practices Violate VPD Digital Recording Policy

The VPD policy 1.9.20, pertaining to the making of digital recordings by VPD members, is explicit that members are to use only VPD-issued devices to make recordings of people, that use of members’ own devices for these purposes is prohibited, and that such use risks breaching the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act^[14] (“FIPPA”) (See items 5, 31, and 33.)^[15] These restrictions and cautions are proper, as the VPD must be able to access these materials to fulfil their obligations in respect of freedom of information requests.

The making of digital recordings of people is further restricted by item 6’s list of limited purposes for which this can be done, which does not include the identification of demonstrators and/or the surveillance of protests. This is an appropriate limit on police officer discretion as it rightly respects the free expression and assembly rights of people in the city of Vancouver that are protected by the Charter.^[16]

Item 7 further requires that members must inform the subject that they will be recorded before beginning the recording unless doing so is unsafe, not reasonably practicable, or would compromise the investigative purpose – conditions that are clearly inapplicable to overt surveillance. Some uncertainty is introduced by item 16, which provides that photos “for intelligence purposes” may be taken of people in public places.

We further observe that, although they are not a VPD regulation or procedure, the VPD’s Public Demonstration Guidelines emphasize the foundational principles of justification, proportionality, and intrusiveness:^[17]

• justification: all police actions shall be pursued toward a necessary and legitimate policing objective.
• Proportionality: the risk and impact of police actions shall be proportional to the priority of the policing objectives, and the severity of the situation in need of intervention.
• Intrusiveness: police actions should be the least intrusive available, as required to achieve success in fulfilling policing responsibilities.

The surveillance practices displayed by the VPD in respect of demonstrations advocating for Palestinian human rights completely undermines these foundational principles given the multiple instances of overt surveillance described above.^[18]

The surveillance has occurred by the use of a drone, by use of a smartphone(s) and possibly by use of body worn camera(s). The recordings have indiscriminately captured personal information of people using public spaces to express themselves politically as well members of the public who used the public areas for other purposes. Vulnerable members of the public, such as children and youth, have been subject to these privacy intrusions by the VPD.

3. Concerns Regarding Use and Disclosure of Personal Information of Protest Participants by VPD Under the Guise of National Security or “Counter-Terrorism”

The complainants are concerned that surveillance information about individuals and their political expression may be disseminated through intelligence channels to domestic national security agencies and foreign governments, putting themselves and their family and friends abroad at risk.

It is reasonable to speculate that such practices may be occurring given the statement from VPD Chief Constable Palmer on October 12, 2023 that “The Vancouver Police Department is working closely with our public safety, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partners, locally, nationally, and internationally. We have activated the VPD Department Operations Centre, which incorporates specialized resources and a senior command structure to coordinate all related activities throughout the city.”^[19] As far as we are aware, the VPD Department Operations Centre and its “specialized resources” may still be deployed for these purposes, and could be intrinsically linked to the overt surveillance by the VPD of people in Vancouver who are simply exercising their Charter rights to gather together and express themselves.

This practice of gathering information to identify protestors and the potential for such information being shared with other state agencies – both domestic and foreign – has a significant chilling effect on political expression that lies “at the very heart”^[20] of the guarantee of freedom of expression enshrined in section 2(b) of the Charter. This chill on free expression is disproportionate to any legitimate law enforcement objective there may be to surveil these activities.

Despite VPD Chief Palmer’s invocation of “counter-terrorism” in last year’s public statement, no evidence has since emerged that the political demonstrations in support of Palestinian human rights in Vancouver have any connection to terrorism, or that they pose any threat whatsoever to Canada’s national security. The narrative that the protests themselves pose any kind of terror or national security risk must therefore be abandoned and rejected by public bodies responsible for public safety, including the VPD and its civilian oversight board.

While in theory people can contact VPD’s Information and Privacy Coordinator to find out how the public body has collected, used and shared personal information about them, the practical reality is that law enforcement agencies frequently invoke exceptions related to police investigations to withhold relevant information from people.^[21]

Other barriers include people experiencing real fears of retaliation by the police for making such a request, citing fees to search their public records (including video evidence), and secret agreements amongst intelligence agencies (domestic and international).

Due to these obstacles, we strongly recommend that the VPD provide clarity to the public as a whole as to how any of the evidence retained from surveillance of protests in support of Palestinian human rights has been managed, shared or otherwise used by the VPD. In other words, we recommend that the VPD not put the onus on individuals to file FOI requests about information held about them by the VPD.

Given the massive gap between the VPD’s overt surveillance of advocates for Palestinian human rights and their own policies and guidelines, the onus should be on the VPD as a public body to notify any individual whose personal information has been passed onto a third party. Ideally the VPD or its civilian oversight board will be able to confirm to the public that no personal information gathered from the surveillance of these protests have been shared with a third party, and that any recordings lacking a clear nexus to a specific criminal investigation have already been destroyed.

4. Impact on Democracy and Charter Rights

This overt surveillance behaviour, which is a prima facie violation of publicly available VPD policy, raises the unnerving possibility that the ultimate purpose of the excessive surveillance is in fact to intimidate and silence people who may want to express support for the people of Palestine and/or express opposition to the actions of the Israeli government. Any such chilling effect has a magnified impact on the free expression and free assembly rights of members of marginalized communities in the lower mainland.

If this is the case, it is clearly an excessive and inappropriate allocation of public resources that flies in the face of the VPD’s duty to uphold the highest laws of the land and safeguard the Charter-protected fundamental freedoms of all people in their jurisdiction. It also likely breaches the VPD’s obligations under FIPPA and privacy rights more generally, including the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

Even if this is not the case and the activities are determined to be in furtherance of a proper law enforcement purpose, we submit that existing VPD policies regarding the surveillance of political expression are inadequate to prevent the VPD from undermining Charter values in a manner inconsistent with that duty. As the Privacy Commissioner of Canada notes:

Video surveillance of public places subjects everyone to scrutiny, regardless of whether they have done anything to arouse suspicion. At the very least it circumscribes, if it does not eradicate outright, the expectation of privacy and anonymity that we have … [T]here is good reason to believe that video surveillance of public places by the police or other law enforcement authorities has a chilling effect on behaviour—and by extension on rights and freedoms.^[22]

For this reason, video surveillance must not be used as a tool of convenience or routine and VPD policy must protect against this possibility.

5. Recommendations

In light of the systemic limitations with police oversight set out in BC’s Police Act, we ask that the Police Complaint Commissioner use its oversight powers to carefully follow this complaint. This includes exercising its powers to recommend an investigation if the Board declines to do so, and to request regular status reports^[23] to be shared with the complainants.

We note that BC’s Policing Standards require police boards to have written policies requiring the board to consider whether a service or policy complaint includes allegations of discriminatory policies or practices when determining which course of action permitted by s. 171 (1) of the Police Act is necessary to respond adequately to a complaint.^[24] Despite the complainant’s failure to find any such policy online, we urge the board to initiate an investigation into this complaint instead of requesting the Chief Constable to investigate and report back to you. We further ask that the board have an independent third party with expertise in human rights conduct the investigation.

In addition to the above recommendation about how to handle the complaint, we further ask that the board use its powers to ensure the following:

• Account for why the VPD has consistently departed from its own policies regarding the audio and video surveillance of people gathering in public for political expression that involves Palestinian human rights;
• Investigate and assess the extent to which anti-Palestinian racism has motivated the VPD to disregard applicable policies intended to safeguard Charter rights;
• As potentially thousands of people have had their privacy invaded by the VPD through these practices, there must be public confirmation about how the VPD has managed the collected information, including whether they have been destroyed, stored or shared with other agencies;
• Clarify the extent to which the privacy interests of children and youth have been impacted by the surveillance;
• Confirm to the public whether any of the information gathered through surveillance of these protests has been shared beyond Canada’s international borders;
• Even with a general accounting to the public about the use and management of the surveillance information, individual members of the public impacted by these practices must have a timely and accessible pathway to confirm that this surveillance of political demonstrations hasn’t resulted in the collection of their personal information and its disclosure beyond the VPD;
• Given the massive gap between the VPD’s overt surveillance of advocates for Palestinian human rights and their own policies and guidelines, the onus must be on the VPD as a public body to notify any individual whose personal information has been passed onto a third party;
• Clarify to the public whether any additional technologies, such as facial recognition software, has been used to process, enhance or otherwise analyse the information gathered through surveillance;
• Update relevant policies to explicitly state, as the RPAS policy does, that ‘intelligence purposes’ do not include identifying attendees at protests and demonstrations;
• Update relevant policies so that they are attentive to the interests of historically marginalized communities;
• Due to the potential for smartphones to record private conversations between people in public spaces, we further recommend strengthening the policy to reduce the likelihood that people’s reasonable expectations of privacy are respected when members of the VPD use smartphones to record.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. We are hopeful that your investigation and subsequent steps will bring the behaviour of VPD’s members into accord with Charter values and ensure that free expression rights are not chilled disproportionately or unnecessarily.

Sincerely,

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

Pivot Legal Society

cc:
BC Human Rights Commissioner, Kasari Govender, [email protected]
Assistant Deputy Minister and Director of Police Services, Glen Lewis, [email protected]

^[1] Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367.

^[2] See "Part 1" for evidence that the BC RCMP unit supporting municipal police has used such a smear.

^[3] International Court of Justice, 26 JANUARY 2024 ORDER (Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide In The Gaza Strip), Available online: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf

^[4] Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., 2005 SCC 62 at para 58; see also Figueiras v. Toronto (Police Services Board), 2015 ONCA 208 at paras 68 & 71.

^[5] Dania Majid for the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association, Anti-Palestinian Racism: Naming, Framing and Manifestations, page 15, available online: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/61db30d12e169a5c45950345/t/627dcf83fa17ad41ff217964/1652412292220/Anti-Palestinian+Racism-+Naming%2C+Framing+and+Manifestations.pdf, citing Marc Lamont Hill & Mitchell Plitnick, Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics, ed (New Press, 2022) https://thenewpress.com/books/except-for-palestine; Palestine Legal. “The Palestine Exception”, (September 2015), online: Palestine Legal https://palestinelegal.org/the-palestineexception

^[6] Martin Lukacs, Inside the ‘shocking’ police operation targeting pro-Palestine activists in Toronto, Breach Media, July 12, 2024. Available online: https://breachmedia.ca/inside-the-shocking-police-operations-targeting-pro-palestine-activists-in-toronto/

^[7] Alex Cosh, Public Safety Saw No Evidence Linking Palestine Rallies To ‘Hamas Call’, The Maple, July 4, 2024. Available online: https://www.readthemaple.com/public-safety-saw-no-evidence-linking-palestine-rallies-to-hamas-call/

^[8] Statement from Chief Constable Adam Palmer (12 October, 2023). Available Online: https://vpd.ca/news/2023/10/12/statement-from-chief-constable-adam-palmer/

^[9] Amanda Follett Hosgood, “The RCMP Sent Its Pipeline Protest Unit to Pro-Palestinian Rallies”, The Tyee, February 2, 2024. Available online: https://thetyee.ca/News/2024/02/ 02/RCMP-Sent-Pipeline-Protest-Unit-Pro-Palestinian-Rallies/

^[10] CRCC Launches Systemic Investigation of the RCMP "E" Division Community-Industry Response Group (C-IRG) https://www.crcc-ccetp.gc.ca/en/newsroom/crcc-launches-systemic-investigation-rcmp-e-division-community-industry-response-group-cirg

^[11] Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Non-Conviction Records” at page 5. Available online: https://ccla.org/recordchecks/doc/Non-Conviction%20Records.pdf

^[12] Vancouver Police Department Regulations & ProceduresManual, 1.13.3 Use of Remotely Piloted Aerial System(RPAS), pages 494-500. Available online: https://vpd.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/regulationsand-procedures-manual.pdf

^[13] Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

^[14] Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165.

^[15] Vancouver Police Department Regulations & Procedures Manual, 1.9.20 Digital Recordings (Images) on Issued Electronic Devices, pages 366-369. Available online: https://vpd.ca/wp- content/uploads/2023/02/regulations-and-procedures-manual.pdf

^[16] Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

^[17] Vancouver Police Department, Public Demonstration Guidelines, Updated May 2017, on page 3. Available online: https://vpd.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/public-demonstration-guidelines.pdf

^[18] The actual approach of the VPD to the public demonstration on May 31, 2024 (forming the basis of the other policy complaint filed by the Complainants today) also undermines these foundational principles.

^[19] Statement from Chief Constable Adam Palmer, October 12, 2023. Available online: https://vpd.ca/news/2023/10/12/statement-from-chief-constable-adam-palmer/.

^[20] Libman v Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 569, 1997 CanLII 326 (SCC) at para 30.

^[21] Often people do not know that state agencies have recorded or shared adverse information about them until they face barriers when attempting to fly, cross international borders and/or seek employment.

^[22] Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance of Public Places by Police and Law Enforcement Agencies (last modified 2 March 2006), online: OPCC < https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/surveillance/police-and-public-safety/vs_060301/ >

^[23] Police Act, RSBC 1996, c. 367, s. 171(2) and (4).

^[24] Provincial Policing Standards, Promotion of Unbiased Policing, 6.1 (21), Available online: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/police/standards/6-1-1-promote- unbiased.pdf

Download the complaint